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This study examines various facets of activating the
National Defense Reserve Force. Its history and background
are reviewed and its present status of readiness considered.
Specific areas covered are monetary costs, manpower capabili-
ties (seagoing and ashore) as well as the physical condition
and capabilities of the fleet.
The sub-structure of the Reserve Fleet known as the Ready
Reserve Force is covered in depth. In this area the inception
of the ready force idea is presented along with its goals and
accomplishments to date. Of unique interest is the joint
funding of the Ready Reserve Force which is contributed to by
both the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense
.
Conclusions are drawn from its past performance, documented
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. INTEREST AND METHODS
The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) has been of
great interest to the author having seen many of its ships
in service throughout Southeast Asia during the Vietnam action.
The thought of millions of dollars in assets "mothballed" and
idle supposedly constantly ready for service was the driving
theme behind this paper. How this use or lack of use of tax-
payers 1 funds can be justified in this era of Proposition 13
the author believes deserves closer scrutiny. Specifically
this paper is focused on how this situation came about, how it
has continued, and why. In general the paper attempts to
answer the question "Is the NDRF necessary and, if it is, is
it being properly maintained and ready if called upon again by
the Department of Defense?"
In the search for facts and information various interviews
were conducted both personally and by telephone. Cooperation
from the Maritime Administration (MARAD) was excellent. Both
the Western Regional Office in San Francisco, California and
the Washington D.C. Headquarters were extremely helpful.
Material was readily available from both MARAD and the Naval
Postgraduate School Library, however, it appears that an eighteen
month to two year time lag is present between events occurring




The purpose of the National Defense Reserve Fleet is to
serve as an inactive reserve for selected ships which would
be activated in order to meet the shipping requirements of
the United States during national emergencies
.
(4 :1) The NDRF
currently consists primarily of World War II Victory ships and
assorted Naval auxiliary ships.
The Maritime Administration has the authority to place in
reserve for national emergency purposes those ships which it
deems necessary for future defense requirements. The choice
of retention ships is made by MARAD in conjunction with the
Secretary of the Navy. (4:1)
The current functions of the NDRF program are two fold in
purpose. First, the preservation of those ships that are re-
quired by law which are considered eligible for retention.
Second, the disposal of non-retention ships, that is those
ships no longer considered necessary for national defense.
The ships designated as retention ships are placed under
a rigorous program of preservation and maintenance with the
objective of performing all work necessary to maintain them in
the same or better condition than they were received in by the
fleet. In view of the unspecified time frame for lay up, the
ships are presumed to be in "lay-up" for an indefinite period.
In this condition, these ships would require thirty to forty
days of activation, once called upon. (4:1) Non-retention ships




Presently the NDRF is comprised mostly of dry-cargo vessels
capable of self discharge, especially suited for outsize mili-
tary cargo, such as the Army's main battle tank. Ships of this
type are commonly referred to as break-bulk vessels . Although
multi-purpose in nature and very versatile a large majority of
the ships assigned to the NDRF are small, slow, and old. There-
fore they have been bypassed technologically and are in need
of modernization.
New ship designs, those post dating World War II, have
generally been in the direction of the intermodal type, mainly
non-self sustaining containerships, Roll-on/Roll-of f (Ro/Ro)
,
Lighter Aboard Ship (Lash), and specialized cargo carriers such
as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) type ships. While these special-
ized vessels are highly profitable and competitive in world
trade they lack one or more of the defense-desirable features
found in the general purpose break-bulk vessels of the NDRF. (5:55)
As American shipbuilders produce fewer general cargo ships
and the existing break-bulk ships age and are scrapped the
Department of Defense (DOD) sealift problems increase. Addi-
tionally as DOD break-bulk capabilities are reduced in the
active merchant fleet the NDRF and its break-bulk capacity will
increase in importance for national defense purposes as the
only domestic source of break-bulk shipping available to aug-
ment the U.S. Merchant Marine and/or the U.S. Navy in time of
need. The necessity for the NDRF is not in question, and the
concept is accepted and supported by DOD.
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However, problem areas do arise in regard to the NDRF.
Specifically a majority of the ships in the fleet are in excess
of thirty years of age and have not been used in over nine
years therefore their capability of meeting DOD requirements
is in question. It can be expected that these ships will have
to be replaced eventually if the NDRF is to remain a viable
arm of national defense, and the question of cost effectiveness,
in this era of cost conscious taxpayers, places the entire pro-
gram in jeopardy. Finally the ultimate problem for DOD is
whether the NDRF can be placed in service quickly enough to
meet national or global emergencies effectively and efficiently




It is the overall intent of this study to investigate the
current capabilities of the merchant reserve fleet, the direc-
tion and course of action undertaken by MARAD and DOD in order
to update and enhance the United States NDRF and to meet their
objectives.
Specifically special attention will be focused on the Ready
Reserve Force (RRF) program recently undertaken jointly by MARAD
and DOD in order to ensure the readiness and availability of
the NDRF.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions listed below have been imposed throughout
this study. They are neither new nor are they original but
rather observations of history and general policy in this country:
13

1. The United States will, because of its political and
military leadership position in the world, continue
to need a strategic deterrent and a complete capa-
bility to conduct both total and selected warfare,
and a merchant marine is part of that capability
and deterrent.
2. The United States will not embark on an all encom-
passing program to revitalize the country's merchant




Time and technology will continue to advance and the
American Merchant Marine will continue to excel in
the field of advanced Marine Technology. American
shipping companies and shipbuilders have been inno-
vators in developing faster and more technologically
advanced merchant ships. (9:23)
4 The necessity and viability of the merchant marine
and the NDRF as the fifth arm of defense can be






At the end of World War II the United States government
held title to more than 5,000 vessels. In order to reestab-
lish world trade the U.S. government decided to sell these
vessels to American citizens and foreign nationals. This
action of providing the means of transportation for inter- »
national trade was expected to stimulate and renew world
commerce. The legislation utilized to achieve the disposal
of the excess shipping was the Merchant Ship Sales Act of
1946.
The Ship Sales Act gave United States citizens preference
in purchasing excess government vessels and also allowed for
trade-in of old ships as credit toward the newer war built
ships. Buying of war surplus ships was also open to foreign
nationals provided the vessels were not needed for future
defense purposes or deemed a necessity for the American
Merchant Marine.
Although sales terms were liberal for both U.S. citizens
and foreign nationals, legislators realized that a large
majority of the surplus ships would not be sold and that a
considerable number of them would remain unused. In order to
address this particular problem the Ship Sales Act created a
government-owned and administered National Defense Reserve
Fleet, which would remain idle and ready for service until needed,
15

These ships originally were incorporated into eight
different sheltered backwater anchorages located throughout
the United States. On the Atlantic Coast the locations were
Hudson River, New York, James River, Virginia, and Wilmington,
Delaware. The Gulf Coast fleets were situated at Mobile,
Alabama and Beaumont, Texas. The Pacific Coast ships were
anchored at Suisun Bay, California, Astoria, Oregon and Olympia,
Washington. On July 1, 194 5 there 1,421 ships in the NDRF.
Exhibit 1 is a breakdown of the total number of NDRF ships by
Fiscal Year in the combined anchorages
.
At the time of establishment the ships in the NDRF were
mostly of World War II construction. As a result of world
shipping fluctuations periodic demands were placed on the
NDRF and a small number of ships cycled in and out of the fleet.
In 1950 an amendment to the Ship Sales Act allowed the bareboat
charter of NDRF ships for use in any service not adequately
served by U.S. flag, private operators on reasonable condi-
tions at reasonable rates. (6:28) The bareboat charter required
the charterer to perform all functions of an owner and only
supplied an unmanned and unprovisioned ship.
The Ship Sales Act of 1946 does not require that every
ship in the NDRF be maintained indefinitely nor does it pre-
clude additions to the fleet. As the immediate demand for
shipping after World War II subsided, many ships were returned
by their owners to the NDRF, and at the end of fiscal year




National Defense Reserve Fleet 1945-1979
FISCAL YEAR SHIPS FISCAL YEAR SHIPS
1945 5 1962 1862
1946 1421 1963 1819
1947 1204 1964 1739
1948 1675 1965 1594
1949 1934 1966 1327
1950 2277 1967 1152
1951 1767 1968 1062
1952 1853 1969 1017
1953 1932 1970 1027
1954 2067 1971 860
1955 2068 1972 673
1956 2061 1973 541
1957 1889 1974 487
1958 2074 1975 419
1959 2060 1976 348
1960 2000 1977 333
1961 1923 1979 318
Sources: ] .. MARAD 1977 (2,69)
!. Ships in The National Defense Reserve
Fleet by Design (10:1)
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In 1950 the Maritime Administration (MARAD) was created
as an agency within the Department of Commerce (DOC) to assume
responsibility for the preservation and maintenance of the
NDRF. On January 15, 1951 the legislation which authorized
the sales of NDRF ships to operators for commercial trade
purposes expired. Because of this expiration reserve ships
could thereafter only be sold for scrap or for non-transportation
purposes or broken out only in time of national emergencies
.
(6 : 28)
Presently the ships of the NDRF are still under the con-
trol of MARAD but their numbers have been reduced to 318. The
vessels in the fleet are of various ship types mainly Victories,
C-3-S-33a, Mariners, and Seatrains. The funding for the NDRF




Throughout the thirty-four year history of the NDRF it has
been called upon many times to support various national emer-
gencies both military and non-military in nature. The first
national crisis that the NDRF participated in began in 1950 when
the United Nations, along with the United States, deemed it
necessary to support South Korea, which was resisting the
aggressions of North Korea. The fact that privately owned
shipping could not meet the military sealift demand for the
conflict quickly became apparent. Over an eighteen month period
during the Korean hostilities 778 U.S. government-owned vessels
were withdrawn from the NDRF, repaired, refitted, and placed
in service. (4 :7)
18

While the Korean action placed unexpected demands on
world shipping another situation develped half a world away
which pushed shipping capabilities to their limits. The ex-
tremely severe winter of 1950 created an inordinately high
demand for American coal in Europe which in turn caused a
shortage of bulk shipping capabilities. The end result of
this shortage was that the freight rates on coal more than
tripled from $3.50 a ton to $13.00 a ton in less than one year
as demand out-distanced supply. This development clearly jeo-
pardized the Marshall Plan because aid money was being unpro-
portionately spent for shipping charges. Action was vitally
needed to drive down shipping costs to ensure that the aid
money went to rebuild war-torn Europe. Again the NDRF was
called into service and the result was that freight rates
dropped as supply met demand with the introduction of more
bottoms.
As the coal problem in Europe was alleviated a more desperate
situation developed in India. Crop failures caused food short-
ages in that country and massive imports of grain were deemed
necessary if the new and fragile democratic government was
to survive. Political impacts aside only the NDRF could pro-
vide the tonnage necessary to move the amounts of grain needed.
By 1953 the world situation had stabilized and the tem-
porary need for additional shipping had decreased considerably.
However, in the United States a shortage of grain storage
space had developed and a new use for the NDRF was about to
19

be discovered. On March 11 , 1953 the Department of Agricul-
ture requested the use of fifty Liberty ships to be used for
surplus grain storage. By February 1954 MARAD had made avail-
able 317 ships in which 7 2 million bushels of grain were
stored. The program of wheat storage lasted for ten years
and at one time the NDRF had on board ten percent of the total
surplus price supported wheat in the United States. (6:29)
In 1956 the "Suez Crisis" started first with the Egyptian
nationalization of the Suez Canal quickly followed by the
Anglo-French expeditionary force seizure of the canal. In
retaliation the Egyptian forces scuttled ships which very
effectively blocked the usage of the waterway. The net result
of this conflict was an eventual rise of charter rates as high
as three hundred percent on some world trade routes as once
again demand out-stripped supply . (6 : 29) These universal rate
hikes again placed a severe burden on the American treasury
because of the extensive U.S. aid program then being conducted
throughout the world. As in the past the NDRF was called upon
successfully to increase shipping tonnage and decrease overall
world freight rates
.
On July 16, 1965 DOD requested MARAD to activate fourteen
Victory type ships and to place them in service at the earliest
possible moment. Once again the aging ships of the NDRF were
to go into service, this time in Southeast Asia. By the end
of 1966, 161 of the 173 General Agency Agreement (GAA) ships
then in service had been activated from the NDRF. (4:7) Under
20

the GAA a NDRF ship was operated by a private shipping company
for use by DOD. When the need for government ships ended in
1970 only 123 ships were returned to the NDRF for retention
and preservation. The remaining fifty ships were designated
as not required and were sold on the world market.
C. RENEWED INTEREST
The decade of the fifties saw an almost continual use of
the NDRF. However, technology was already quickly surpassing
the fleet. During that decade the S.S. United States was
launched, and it was reputed to have a top speed approaching
forty knots, far surpassing any ship previously built. (6:33)
Also the N.S. Savannah was constructed putting the merchant
marine in the realm of nuclear power. Probably the most impor-
tant commercial marine break-through in modern times started
in 1956 when Malcom P. Mclean, a former truck-line executive,
proved it was feasible to stow cargo aboard ship in truck
containers. This single innovation changed the face of the
U.S. Merchant Marine and led to a dramatic decrease in the
commercial use of break-bulk ships.
In 1960 a joint Navy-MARAD group determined that many NDRF
ships no longer were beneficial for national defense. As a
result only 891 ships were selected for continued retention,
with the remaining ships designated for scrapping. These ships
were broken into two groups, the first Navy priority ships and
the second MARAD priority ships. These two groups were further
21

broken down to number categories with certain ships being
given preference with respect to maintenance and repair
.
(6 : 30)
On October 23, 1969 the Merchant Marine Act of 1970 became
law. The purpose of this legislation was to revitalize the
United States Merchant Marine. Although during debate over
the bill the NDRF was discussed and actions proposed, nothing
concerning the NDRF was actually accomplished. When the legis-
lation was finally enacted it was silent concerning the NDRF
.
In November of 1970 the last of the NDRF ships activated
for service in Southeast Asia were deactivated. The ships
had done their job. However, the future of the NDRF was
becoming doubtful as the ships approached thirty years of
age, clearly decisions concerning the NDRF had to be made.
Various proposals surfaced concerning the fleet. In 1971
DOD sponsored a far-reaching review of the NDRF known as the
"Sealift Procurement and National Security" (SPANS) study.
Among other things it recommended the purchase of relatively
new ships for the NDRF that would otherwise be sold to foreign
countries or scrapped. In 1972 $30 million was added to the
Department of Commerce budget request for the purchase of
such shipping. However, this request was disallowed by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the grounds that the
NDRF was military in nature and as such funding for upgrading
should come from DOD.
Although MARAD was responsible for the NDRF interest was
obviously low in the first half of the seventies. Naturally
22

MARAD attention focused on revitalizing the active merchant
fleet in conjunction with the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
For fiscal year 1975, the total MARAD budget request was
$586,162,000. Of this amount $4,358,000 - less than one per-
cent was designated for NRDF support. (6 : 31) Although little
money entered the NDRF it generated a great deal of revenue.
Exhibit 2 shows revenues acquired for ships sold as scrap or
for non-transportation purposes for the U.S. government.
EXHIBIT 2
Ships Sold For Scrap
YEAR SHIPS SOLD VALUE
1976 75 $11,908,283
1977-T 2 $ 470,000
1977 21 $ 2,610,826
1958-1977 2,270 $192,200,,000
Sources: 1. MARAD 1976 (3:49)
2. MARAD 1977 (2:65)
On January 2, 1975 Public Law 93-045 was signed. It
authorized the Secretary of Commerce to acquire Mariner class
vessels from private owners (who would otherwise scrap them)
in exchange for obsolete ships from the NDRF which could then
be scrapped. The expressed purpose of this law was to upgrade




Early in 1976 discussions were held between Navy and MARAD
personnel with an objective for developing an approach to
provide DOD with sufficient break-bulk shipping during national
emergencies in the shortest possible time. To accomplish this
goal MARAD proposed that thirty of the NRDF ships be upgraded
by a four phased plan. The DOD accepted this proposal and
the Navy's Program Objective Memorandum for FY 1977 provides
for Navy funding to commence work. (8:1) OBM apparently accepted
this program in view of the fact that DOD and not MARAD money
was utilized. At the beginning of FY 1977 the U.S. Navy trans-
ferred to MARAD $5.2 million to begin upgrading selected ships





As cited earlier the ships of the NDRF have been utilized
for national defense purposes twice during their thirty-four
year existence. Each time the ships were called upon they
performed well but not without difficulties and certainly not
without costs. The two defense related call ups discussed
refer to the Korean Police Action and the conflict in South-
east Asia.
1. Korea : As of mid 1950, there were 2277 ships in the
various reserve fleets: 239 were Victory ships, 1564 Liberty
ships and the remainder were miscellaneous military and pre-
World War II vessels. During the Korean hostilities 778
Government-owned ships were withdrawn, repaired, refitted, and
placed in service. (1: 23) The method of utilizing these ships
was the General Agency Agreement (GAA) . Within DOD the ships
came under the auspices of the Military Sea Transportation
Service (MSTS) . The private operator was responsible for
overseeing repairs, providing a crew, and general provisioning.
The government paid for the break-out costs, and activation
costs in addition to the private operators expense and fees.
In March of 1951 the National Shipping Authority (NSA) was
established to provide the administrative machinery to super-
vise the operation of the reactivated vessels. From mid-March
through December 1951, the NSA activated 443 vessels. The
25

cost of activation was $60 million or $135,000 per ship. By
the second quarter of 1952 GAA ships decreased to 183 and
government vessels on charter fell to 91 by mid-1952. As the
need for the NDRF ships decreased they were returned to the
reserve fleet at an average cost of $19,000 per ship. (4:7)
Although break-out times were excellent (an average of
more than three ships every two days) and costs were reasonable
it should be pointed out that the ships were fairly new and
required little preparation. Even though time and cost figures
are impressive for the NDRF during the Korean Action they do
not tell the full story.
During that national emergency the most acute problem
encountered by activating the NDRF was the shortage of sea-
going manpower. The number of seaman jobs increased dramatically
from 57,000 in June 1950 to 87,000 in June 1951 an increase
of fifty-three percent in one year. (1:24) Although jobs were
plentiful at sea, personnel to fill them were in short supply.
Specifically high wages and plentiful job opportunities ashore
coupled with the uncertain future of a long career at sea made
seafaring at this time unenhancing for many. This shortage
occurred even though there was an abundance of trained mari-
time personnel in the country with experience dating back to
World War II. This shortage of skilled seamen in all ratings
both crew and officers seriously delayed many sailings. (4 : 7)
2. Vietnam : The next military demand on the NDRF began
fifteen years later on July 16, 1965. At this time there were
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1,594 ships in the reserve fleet and of them only 960 ships
were under preservation. (5: 53) As during the Korean Police
Action the ships operated under General Agency Agreement con-
tracts with private operators. By 1970 a total of 173 ships
were under GAA and of these 161 had been activated between
1965 and 1970. They moved more than thirty percent of all
cargo to Southeast Asia. Interestingly, during the Vietnam
conflict ninety-six percent of all military freight moved by
sealift under the auspices of the Military Sealift Command
(MSC) which had replaced the MSTS
.
The first fifty-one ships activated were placed on berth
between twenty-one and forty-three days (See Exhibit 3) . All
activation costs for the first forty-seven ships averaged
$500,000 per ship. (1:25) The initial group of fourteen ships
were worked on around the clock and all short cuts allowed by
safety requirements were taken.
During the initial operating period, approximately one year,
about seventy percent of the fifty-one ships activated in 1965
suffered casualties resulting in lost time averaging ten days
per ship. (1:27) Most major ship casualties occurred within
the first three months of operation with boilers accounting
for about one-third of all casualties. Appendix A lists problem
areas causing lost time on reactivated Vietnam conflict ships.
During the six year period of operation, maintenance and
repair costs totaled $84,940,291 for an average of $445 per
voyage day. (1:28) Appendix B displays the number of voyage


















1 14 July 17, 1965 Aug. 7, 1965 21
2 8 Aug. 17, 1965 Sept. 27, 1965 41
3 28 Aug. 28, 1965 Oct. 10, 1965 43
4 1 Oct. 19, 1965 Nov. 21, 1965 31
5 25 Dec. 15, 1965 Feb. 6, 1966 53
6 6 Feb. 7, 1966 Apr. 15, 1966 67
7 6 Mar. 12, 1966 May 15, 1966 64
8 6 Apr. 12, 1966 June 15, 1966 64
9 7 May .L2, 1966 July 15, 1966 64




each year of reserve fleet vessel usage during the Southeast
Asia conflict. Activation and repair costs are broken down
in Exhibit 4.
EXHIBIT 4
ACTIVATION AND REPAIR COSTS : The average shipyard costs to
reactivate, maintain and repair, and deactivate NDRF vessels
during Vietnam use were as follows:
Reactivation $476,937 (161 ships)
Maintenance and Repair $490,984 (173 ships)
Deactivation $ 45,392 (123 ships)
$1,013,313
Source: National Defense Reserve Fleet Response
Plan (1:28)
Shipyard capabilities during this period generally were
sufficient to meet the demand placed on them. However, diffi-
culties onboard ship did arise from prolonged operations out-
side the United States. The general lack of repair facilities
in the Western Pacific caused ship delays far out of proportion
to the severity of the casualties.
As during the Korean Action manpower was a severe problem.
From 1965 to 1968 personnel shortages caused delays in 592 of
1,405 scheduled sailings. Appendix C displays delayed sailings
due to crew shortages. These shortages existed despite all
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efforts made by MARAD, other Federal agencies, and private
organizations to solve the problem. Reasons cited for this
shortfall of seagoing personnel are as follows:
a. Lack of sufficient number of qualified crew.
b. Generous vacations requiring greater numbers
of crews.
c. Reluctance to sail on older ships.
d. High attrition rate of licensed officers due
to long periods at sea, high average ages and
eligibility for retirement.
e. Inability of MARAD to have maritime personnel
exempt from military service. (1:32)
Overall the aging ships of the NDRF performed well through-
out the Vietnam conflict. Although break-downs occurred they
were not the main cause for delays. Most delays were attri-
buted to a shortage of Vietnamese docking facilities and crew
shortages. (5:54) By November 1970, the last reserve ship was
returned to the NDRF.
3. OTHER PAST PROBLEMS : Congressional hearings and MARAD/
GAO reports indicated the following additional problem areas
encountered in past activations.
a. Procurement - GAO found that MARAD had not
established adequate procurement procedures
for purchase of necessary equipment and
supply items to outfit vessels.
b. GAA Operator Compensation - there were con-
tentions from GAA operators that the compen-
sation to husband vessels in the Vietnam
reactivation ($7 5 per day initially, later
revised to $125 per day) was non-compensatory.
c. GAA Funding Procedures - GAO concluded that
excessive funds were being advanced to GAA
agents, pointing out that the amount of cash
advanced should be as close to daily needs
30

of recipient agent as administratively prac-
ticable, Marads ' surveillance procedures
over advanced funds were also criticized.
d. Other GAA Related Issues - these issues
included the large number of agents , the
continued expansion of agents no matter
how marginally qualified and need for
remedial action in case of inadequate
performance. (1:35)
B. THE PRESENT
In order to activate a Victory ship of the NDRF in 1977
it was projected that it would take thirty to forty days. As
discussed earlier DOD concluded that this time frame was
unsatisfactory and deemed a five to ten day break out period
for thirty Victory Ships was necessary . (4 : 11) Although the
initial plan for the Ready Reserve Fleet composed of thirty
World War II Victory ships was accepted by DOD and funded by
the Navy, the Program was changed almost immediately.
In 1977 the trade-in of five C-3 break-bulk ships con-
structed in 1960-61 provided a more modern basis for the NDRF.
Additionally, the "Seatrain" series of ships, which are fully
self-sustaining, already in the NDRF presented to military
planners a better alternative and a more efficient method of
carrying vehicles and helicopters. Finally the addition of
three Mariner Class vessels constructed in the 1950' s joined
the fleet in 1978 further offering newer, faster, and more
modern ships for RRF status.
In view of the change taking place within the NDRF, MARAD
in conjunction with the Navy altered the objectives of the RRF.
The revised objectives were to first provide DOD with a sealift
31

capability equivalent to that of thirty Victory ships (approxi-
mately 340,000 measurement tons), that is a variety of ships
types would be utilized rather than only Victories as originally
planned, and second provide activation within five to ten days
for deployment during national emergencies. (18 :1) Obviously
these goals cannot be met immediately. MARAD will, as money
becomes available from the U.S. Navy, bring the required ton-
nage up to RRF standards. Exhibit 5 presents the ships in
RRF status as of February 28, 1979 and the ships that may
eventually join the fleet.
Although special attention has recently been given to the
RRF ships it has not degraded the remaining ships in the NDRF.
Even though the Victory ships are not utilized as much in the
RRF as first planned they still constitute the largest, 13
out of 218, group of ships in the NDRF retention list for
defense purposes. (.10 : 3)
According to DOC the ships of the NDRF are deemed to be in
good condition and properly maintained. (.4 : 14) This is pri-
marily due to the dehumidification (D/H) systems which have
virtually eliminated interior corrosion and deterioration caused
by moisture. (1:10) In addition to the D/H the ships are pro-
tected with a hull electrocathodic protection system to minimize
underwater hull deterioration through corrosion or electrolytic
action.
Additionally spare parts for the Victory ships have been
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Beaumont, Texas, Suisun Bay, California and in a warehouse in
Kearney, New Jersey. The other four fleets having been
phased out by 1973. These spare parts have been thoroughly
reconditioned and are ready for use.
C. CURRENT PROBLEMS
1. THE ENVIRONMENT : The ships of the NDRF were constructed
well before the increased emphasis on environmental protection.
Two environmental requirements imposed by Federal law impact
on the NDRF. First, new requirements necessitate that oily
waste and oily bilge slops be retained aboard for later dis-
posal at sea or in special containers in port and secondly there
is a new requirement to collect and dispose of all sanitation
effluent.
Both of the requirements cited above help ensure that the
waterways and coastal areas of the United States no longer
suffer the ravages of pollution from passing ships. By re-
quiring vessels to retain on board oil wastes and sewage for
proper legal disposal the environment will be better protected.
Both requirements are fully described in Appendices D and E.
Because of the expense involved in complying with these
requirements the NDRF is not expected to be upgraded to com-
pliance until needed. When the NDRF is pressed into service
the cost would probably be no object and the requirements met.
If time does not permit waivers would most likely be obtained
from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) . The waivers could be granted
on the grounds that the ships are "public vessels" which means
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a vessel owned or chartered and operated by the United
States. (1:61)
2. REGULATORY GROUPS : Two principal regulatory groups
having impact on the NDRF are the United States Coast Guard
and the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) . Other groups
having lesser impact on the NDRF are the Public Health Service
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (1:50)
The responsibilities of the USCG are covered by three
Codes of Federal Regulations (CFR's) which are listed in
Appendix F. Inspection and survey requirements contained in
the CFR's are applicable to all U.S. flag vessels except for
MARAD vessels which are exempt by Title 46 Chapter 1, Subpart
90.05. However, as a means of assuring safety in its ships,
MARAD has in past emergencies always required that all regu-
lations be met.
The American Bureau of Shipping is a classification society
which issues rules for building ships and conducting surveys
to insure compliance with these rules. The USCG accepts the
ABS as the prime authority assigning and issuing Load Lines
under the provisions of the 1966 International Convention.
Requirements for periodic inspections and surveys are
listed in various USCG and ABS regulations. Appendix G lists
the highlights of these requirements.
The USCG has indicated that if a full-scale mobilization
were required the ships of the RRF would be placed in service
no matter the status of certification. However, if a limited
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emergency occurred and time was not a factor then certain
requirements would have to be met prior to the ships entering
service.
The Federal Communication Commission (FCC) has many rules
regarding required characteristics of ships radios and these
are based on statutory, treaty, or international agreements.
Although the FCC has stated that it does not have the power
to waive such requirements it would be sympathetic to requests
for temporary waivers, as long as it is within legal limits.
3. SHIPYARD CAPABILITY : In order to assess the feasibility
of the RRF and the NDRF the shipyard capabilities of the United
States must be considered. Although the NDRF is maintained in
a high state of readiness and preservation a certain amount of
shipyard work would have to be accomplished if the ships were
required for service.
There are approximately 270 firms throughout the United
States that repair ships, of which about thirty-five are capa-
ble of performing both drydock and topside work. The remaining
235 firms tend to be rather small and are limited in capability.
The thirty-five large companies account for approximately
eighty percent of the total dollar value of repair work
performed. (1:82)
The U.S. shipbuilding and repair industry is not one of
the corporate giants in the country, nor does it attract
national attention such as steel, auto or food production.
In size it ranks only fortieth on the basis of gross sales,
contributes approximately 0.3 percent to the Gross National
36

Product (GNP) and accounts for a relatively small portion
of the national labor force. (9:31) However, these facts and
figures are extremely misleading when viewed in the light of
their importance to National Defense and the impact they have
on regional employment levels.
If the U.S. shipyards are to meet the possible future
requirements of national defense they must maintain a compe-
tent work force. As of October 1, 1978 U.S. shipyard employees
in commercial yards of major size numbered 94,355.(11:260)
Estimates put forth by the Shipbuilders Council of America (SCA)
forecast a fifty percent decrease in shipyard employment by
1983.(16:3) This decline can be attributed to various factors
such as an aging work force much of it dating back to World
War II and the Korean Action, and therefore eligible for
retirement en masse. Additionally, the Council forecast for
revenues reflects a general decline in merchant and naval
shipbuilding with a slight increase in ship repair volume.
Exhibit 6 projects an estimated annual revenue average for
the 1979-1983 time frame. The history of ship repair activity
in the U.S. shows that it is an industry which is subject to
great fluctuation in wordload. Appendix H displays the aver-
age monthly employment in selected commercial yards from
1959-1975.
Naturally if a national emergency takes place and ships
are required the work force of the nations shipyards will not
remain static. Appendix I displays shipyards by location,
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figures are the maximum estimated by MARAD. Naturally this
buildup of personnel would take time and coordination, as
many of them would be unskilled. The important basis of such
planning is that shipyards maintain an adequate skilled labor
force to build from when necessary.
United States shipyards presently maintain the capability
of activating the RRF in the time frame allowed of five to
ten days. (1:86) This capability is further enhanced in light
of the fact that the ships of the RRF will not require dry-
docking when activated. In addition yards have substantial
capability to expand their labor force to handle peak demands.
(1:91)
The non-RRF ships in the NDRF would be expected to take
longer to activate. These vessels would require thirty to
forty days for activation according to MARAD estimates
.
(1: 4)
4 . MANNING : Limited emergency actions , in the context
of manning, are more difficult to deal with than an all out
call-up for general war. In the case of a general war the
nation's entire facilities are called upon to support the
military and the concentration on the movement of ocean shipping
becomes of paramount importance.
As cited earlier, past history has shown that manpower was
an important factor in affecting the operation of the NDRF in
both the Korean Action and Southeast Asia. Although this
problem may not be alleviated in the future many factors have
combined to decrease its potential impact. Although the num-
ber of ships in the U.S. Merchant Marine has been decreasing
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steadily the carrying capacity has actually increased as
displayed in Exhibit 7. In addition, the actual number of
crew aboard each ship has decreased substantially from about
forty to fifty in the 1950' s and early 1960 's, to as low as
twenty-six to thirty on some newer ships.
EXHIBIT 7
Private U.S. Merchant Marine 1950-1976





Although the number of ships has decreased dead weight
tonnage has remained fairly steady and is higher than it was
before the Korean Police Action.
Source: National Defense Reserve Fleet Response
Plan (1:126)
These reductions were accomplished through advanced
technology and shipboard mechanization especially in the deck
and engineering departments. Thus jobs have peaked from
48,118 in 1967 to a low of 20,501 on January 1, 1976.(1:127)
These reductions have resulted in earlier retirements and




As of January 1, 1979 there were 3,507 personnel in
training in State and Federal Maritime Academies . In addition
union training and upgrading programs are constantly turning
out skilled seamen.
In view of the present level of unemployment coupled with
the output of maritime training schools, many of whom cannot
find seagoing employment, it is doubtful that the shortages
that have occurred in the past will occur in the near future
if the RRF ships are activated.
However, a general activation of the NDRF would place a
demand of approximately 5,000 jobs on the system. In that
case contingency planning as listed below would be required:
a. Work out agreement with union to permit crew
to ship out during vacations, and permit
retirees to reenter service for duration.
b. Obtain understanding with USCG to continue
policy of waiving manning requirements , and
permit acceleration of upgrading crew and
officers especially in critical areas.
c. Accelerated Federal, State and union training
and upgrading.
d. Request national exemption from military
service if available for officers and skilled
crews on ships operating in military zones.
(1:129)
Additionally, if these alternatives are not enough or not






Will the NDRF ever be called upon in the future to perform
during national emergency? Will the NDRF be ready if called
upon, on short notice, to perform as it has in the past? Only
time and an actual crisis will accurately answer these ques-
tions. Predicting the future is impossible, but lessons
should be learned from the past. Although doubts may be
raised about national preparedness for war it is apparent
that the future of the merchant marine area of defense is
being planned and action is being taken.
The NDRF of the future is being prepared for by both MARAD
and the Navy. The RRF program is the vanguard of the NDRF
future. Having learned many lessons concerning activation
problems over the past thirty years, specifically concerning
Vietnam and Korea, the NDRF and especially the RRF program
are ready for and counting on change. The RRF ships expect
to be ready when required and they in turn will buy the time
necessary to bring the NDRF ships into action by filling the
initial needs of DOD in time of crisis.
A perfect example of the flexibility of the RRF program
was the changing of direction from utilizing thirty Victory
ships to requiring 340,000 DWT spread among newer ships of
various configurations. A minor sign of the change antici-
pated in the program is that the manual prepared by MARAD which
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sets forth the detailed plans and procedures for managing
the RRF program, for upgrading the NDRF ships to RRF status,
and for activating RRF ships is in loose leaf form in order
that change may be disseminated quickly and efficiently.
The immediate future of the RRF program is relatively
secure in view of its inclusion in the Five Year Defense
Program for FY 1977 through FY 1982. Additionally, there is
no current deadline to be met and presently the program is
expected to be ongoing past FY 1982. Although a great deal of
attention is being given to the RRF ships there has been no
indication that the importance of the remaining Victory and
other classes of the NDRF will be downgraded. Also there is
no projection to replace or scrap large numbers of ships in
the near future. The fact that many of the Victory ships have
had limited use in their lifetime indicates that they have
extensive future service and capability remaining.
B. RRF PLANNING
1. The immediate future of the NDRF basically evolves
around the RRF program. MARAD in conjunction with the Navy
has developed a four phase activation plan in order that the
deadweight tonnage (DWT) equivalent of thirty Victory ships
will be fully operational and ready for cargo with five to ten
days notice. The four distinct phases are thoroughly discussed
in Appendix J. Briefly stated the phases are:
a. Phase 1 - An initial activation to bring the
vessels to a ready status.
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b. Phase II - The steps required to return
vessels to the NDRF in a RRF
status
.
c. Phase III - Actions to maintain the ships in
a RRF status.
d. Phase IV - A final activation for service to
make the vessels fully opera-
tional. (4:25)
2. As the NDRF has decreased over the years the number
of fleet sites have been reduced accordingly from eight to
three, one on each coast. They are:
a. Suisun Bay - Martinez, California
b. James River - Fort Eustis, Virginia
c. Neches River - Beaumont, Texas
Each fleet is a complete entity consisting of its own work
force, service craft, and equipment. Maintenance and preserva-
tion are primarily conducted, since the facilities have no
repair or upgrading capabilities. An important factor in the
geographical distribution (Exhibit 5, Page 33) of the RRF
ships is the availability of shipyards that could accomplish
the final Phase IV work. In order to determine the amount of
preactivation work to be accomplished a critical path analysis
was made in order to ascertain the controlling work items at
the time of activation.
Presently there are ten ships in the RRF with a final goal
of about thirty ships depending on further trade-ins. A firm
commitment on the next group of ships for the RRF has not been
made. Although the classes of ships have been altered from
the original plan little else has been changed. That is the
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the goals, time frames, and activation procedures remain
basically the same. Appendices K, L, M and N (Pages 71-74)
display the basic characteristics of the ship types presently
in the RRF specifically the C4-S-la (Mariners) , C-3-S-33a,
VC2-S-AP3 (Victories) and T2-E-A3 (Seatrain)
.
3. A key element of the RRF program is that the ships
will be brought up to full certification status during activa-
tion thereby considerably reducing break-out times. Addi-
tionally all drydock work will be accomplished during acti-
vation thus allowing any bottom cleaning or minor underwater
repairs to be accomplished at pierside during break out. The
alleviation of a queueing problem at the drydocks during break
out will greatly facilitate the ability of the RRF ships to
be on berth within the ten days requirement. This will also
ease the movement of the remaining NDRF ships into the drydock
when they are required.
4. The agreement between the Navy and MARAD calls for a
ship to be randomly selected, without notice, with tests to
consist of full activation and sea steaming for a twenty-four
hour period. (8:3) Theoretically these tests conducted annually
will guarantee the validity of the program and attest to the
effectiveness of its management. In FY 1977 the S.S. Washington
was activated from the NDRF for Reforger '77 and was given an
extended sea trial by steaming from Norfolk, Virginia to
Rotterdam, the Netherlands and back. In FY 1978 the S.S. Maine
took part in Reforger '78. Both ships performed as expected.
45

There is no reason to assume that the performance of the NDRF
ships in their annual exercises will change in the future.
C. CONTRACTURAL ARRANGEMENTS
1. The Master Repair Contract (MRC) is an existing con-
tractural instrument which is used for planning and executing
the RRF program. As of January 1, 1976 there were seventy-
three contractors operating under MRC with MARAD.(4:36) The
shipyards under contract vary in size from having unlimited
financial constraints with drydock facilities to those with
severe financial constraints and no drydock capabilities.
Geographically, the yards are distributed as follows:
37-Eastern Region (including one on the Great Lakes) , 18-Central
Region and 19-Western Region. (4 : 36) These contracts are
currently in use by MARAD and will be utilized to activate
the RRF ships during these various phases.
2. The General Agency Agreement (GAA) is another existing
contractural arrangement which will be used in the planning
and eventual operation of reactivated ships. During the Viet-
nam conflict forty general agents were used for MARAD ships
in future emergency the RRF ships are expected to need fewer
agents depending on the number of ships used.
The basic difference between the MRC and the GAA contracts
is that the former is for repair and activation and the latter





Obviously during an emergency the break-out of the reserve
fleet will face particular problems concerning the procurement
of replacement parts, equipment, and various asundry items.
The short time allotted for break-out could cause severe dis-
order and make impossible competitive methods of procurement.
In order to coordinate procurement in such circumstances, a
National Priority Designation System has been established for
setting procurement priorities. This system is under the
direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) , and covers
all government procurement systems . (4 : 37) MARAD will be placed
in the National Priority System in advance of activation measures
and hopefully many problems will be solved prior to their
appearance.
E. THE FUTURE
The future of the NDRF and RRF program depends almost
entirely on planning for the unpredictable with no real refer-
ence point except the past. MARAD and DOD are obviously not
satisfied with the status quo as is evident by their ongoing
program to revitalize, improve, and prepare the NDRF. If the
future is to be prepared for, the present must be a constant
search for improvement. Even though uncertainties are guar-
anteed the future will invariably belong to those who plan for





Although conclusions concerning the NDRF and its RRF
component can be made it is necessary to note that it is
virtually impossible to know all the facts concerning the public
policy surrounding the past, present, and future of the reserve
ships of our sealift capability. Decisions have been and
will be made concerning the NDRF that are influenced by many
factors such as cost considerations, political impacts, national
defense, and statistical inferences to name a few.
It would be presumptuous to suggest that the conclusions
and recommendations included in this study are all encompassing
or that they will not change in the near or distant future.
Public and national defense policies will never remain static
and change is inevitable.
The NDRF has performed well when called upon to sail to
war, to lower world freight rates, and for storing surplus
agricultural products. It has met the commitments given to
it and has required little in return. Also, it must be noted
that each time the NDRF was utilized there were no viable
alternatives and without its existence both military and
economic policies of the United States could possibly have
faltered and thereby changing the world balance of power both
economically and militarily. Only the imagination can explore
the possibilities of a different outcome on the Korean peninsula,
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the Marshall Plan or a failure to display determination in
Southeast Asia.
B. CONSIDERATIONS
However, drawing from interviews, readings, and experience
certain conclusions have been reached and are set forth in
the following text.
1. The NDRF was never really planned on and actually came
into existence as a by-product of World War II. When the huge
number of war surplus ships were laid up no one envisioned
the important role and varied uses they would perform in
world economics and military strategy. Because of this un-
planned creation and unexpected benefit at little cost to the
government the NDRF has been taken for granted and seen as
an ever existing resource requiring little attention.
2. The United States is an island nation dependent on
maritime power for a constant and ever expanding number of
resources from overseas. A prime example of waterborn trade
upon which the U.S. is dependent is the movement of oil from
the Middle East. In 1954, twenty-five percent of our imports
came in on U.S. flag ships today that figure is about five
percent. In the future, the U.S. may be subject to economic
blackmail. (15:9)
3. Unless the possibility of war is eliminated, especially
so-called brush fire wars that have become prominant through-
out the world, DOD will continue to require sealift capabilities,
Although the NDRF and the RRF component meet present DOD
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requirements, it is possible that these requirements may
fall short of actual need when a crisis occurs. Some possible
changes in requirements could occur from:
a. A sudden need to remove U.S. citizens from
countries overseas would require additional
ships quickly. This would necessitate a
sealift in reverse of what is now visualized,
thus requiring many more ships.
b. A pre-emptive strike on the active merchant
fleet cutting its number drastically and
thereby quickly decreasing the sealift
capabilities assumed available.
4. The U.S. shipbuilding industry and the U.S. shipping
industry will, in order to remain competitive continue to
advance maritime technology. Only through automation, greater
carrying capacity, and efficiency will Americans be able to
continue as a maritime economic power. The industries will
not regress to break-bulk all purpose shipping capabilities
similar to the ships of the NDRF.
5. The NDRF has in the past suffered from a lack of funds.
An example of this shortfall is:
In FY 1976 maritime authorization, the
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee recommended out of a total
budget of $589,718,000 only $4,242,000
for the NDRF (less than the amount
recommended for maritime training at the
Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point




6. There is a great deal of misunderstanding about the
merchant marine and even more about the NDRF by both the public
and the military. The merchant marine is never thought of as
part of the defense system until required. The NDRF and com-
mercial ships are expected to be available when needed ignoring
the fact that break out takes time and that profit making dic-
tates the constant use of active ships. During the 1973 Israeli
resupply effort seventy-four percent of the supplies moved by
ships even though a great deal was heard about the Military
Airlift Command's C-5 and C-141 cargo planes accomplishments.
However, it should be noted that the first nine crucial ship-




There is a sharp contrast between the maritime policy
of the United States and the maritime policy of the Soviet
Union. In the Soviet Union, the commercial fleet, the fishing
fleet the oceanographic fleet, and the Navy are closely and
directly controlled by Moscow. (15,8) However, in the U.S.
separation of maritime interests is almost as great as the
separation of church and state.
8 The prime consideration to be given to activating the
NDRF and the RRF is not the question of the ships but rather
the availability of trained knowledgable seamen. Additionally,
although the shipyards are and will be available, the shortage
of skilled workers could seriously hamper activation proce-
dures and cause severe delays too.
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Although many drawbacks concerning the NDRF have been
alluded to there are positive signs for the future.
1. Apparently the almost orphan status of the NDRF has
been altered in view of the fact that the U.S. Navy, with
MARAD guidance, will expend $42.9 million during a five year
program to update the ships. Obviously, interest has been
renewed in the NDRF and its position in national defense has
been secured for the near future.
2. Signs of communication and cooperation are beginning
to show between the merchant marine and the Navy. Not only
in the financial area but also on the personnel level and
material areas such as:
a. Communication tests have been conducted between
military and non-military ships.
b. MARAD personnel have been involved with national
and Nato military authorities concerning logistic
war plans.
c. U.S. merchant ships conduct periodic exercises
with Navy units such as exercise Roller Coaster
and exercise Reforger both conducted in 1977.
d. Officers are periodically exchanged between the
Navy and the merchant marine under the auspices
of the Running Mate Program. (2 : 68)
C. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
Even though not all these programs and exercises deal
directly with the NDRF they are important in order that
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cooperation, knowledge, and understanding come about between
the Navy and the merchant marine. Even if complete inte-
gration of purpose and direction cannot be accomplished at
least a spirit of cooperation and common purpose can be
attained for the good of the nation as a whole.
Although MARAD and the Navy have done a great deal to
ready the NDRF for possible service many problems still exist.
These problems will require solving prior to a smooth flow of
shipping from NDRF anchorages to the loading berths and
ultimately the wartime unloading zone
.
Although the negative conclusions outweigh the positive
ones in number, it should not be interpreted that the NDRF
is out of date or poorly managed. Quite the opposite, the
conclusions of this study are that the NDRF is extremely well
managed and the NDRF is a ready and viable asset for the






If the U.S. Merchant Marine and the NDRF are deemed
necessary by DOD, and the country in general, then an overall
comprehensive national maritime policy needs to be formulated
rather than the patchwork policy now followed. Clearly shipping
and shipbuilding are intricate parts of the American defense
policy. This idea has been fostered and developed throughout
U.S. history by maritime laws and clearly stated by declaration
of policy.
However, rhetoric and good intentions alone will never
bring about a strong viable reserve fleet of ships ready to
be called into action when needed. What is required is clear
decisive action on the part of MARAD, DOD, and above all the
Congress of the United States. Without the support of Con-
gress nothing can be accomplished. The NDRF must not be
relegated to secondary importance in the area of ongoing national
defense but rather it must be considered along with all other
primary factors as an integral part of our economic and mili-
tary well-being.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are set forth for the future
improvement and ensured dependability of the NDRF. Again, the
implication should not be perceived that the present policies
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concerning the NDRF are unsatisfactory but rather that there
is always room for improvement and no policy should remain
static in a changing world.
1. Justify the required tonnage periodically and review
it under varying scenarios
.
2. Accelerate and expand the RRF program. In view of
uncertain world conditions perhaps a five year program is too
lengthy as the ships may be required this year and not in 1982.
Additionally, losses due to activation delays and sinkings
should be expected during a crisis and additional tonnage may
be required faster than the NDRF could provide it.
3. Ensure agreement between all cognizant parties required
for activation such as DOD, Navy, DOC, MARAD, USCG, ABS, FCC,
unions, and agents . Verify that they agree completely and know
thoroughly what is required and expected from each of them.
As little as possible should be left to chance. After the
crisis occurs discovering avoidable fallacies in the system
will frustrate and further delay ship deliveries.
4. Conduct periodic inspections of the ships and spare
parts inventories annually, preferably by independent agencies
with full reports submitted to MARAD, DOD, and Congress.
5
.
Identify the necessary shipyards and operating agents
well in advance and a central authority, MARAD, should
periodically determine their capability to perform these
required functions
.
6. Project manpower requirements both ashore and afloat
realistically and avoid statistical pitfalls. Varying sources
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give conflicting solutions for solving manpower problems.
Studies conducted for the Navy suggest the possible use of
civilians in Navy ships to alleviate shortages. (14 : 9) Mean-
while studies conducted for MARAD put forth the possible use
of military crews in merchant ships to satisfy shortages.
(1:129) In view of this conflict a complete study should be
performed projecting the seagoing manpower in the future with
disregard for civilian or military status. Obviously such a
study would have to be coordinated with both MARAD and the
Navy, and it is recommended that it be done by an independent
agency
.
7. Expand joint exercises conducted by the Navy and the
merchant marine such as exercise Reforger. In the past one
ship annually has been exercised from the East/Gulf Coast
fleets. If the undertaking is to be truly creditable more
ships from the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific Coasts should be
utilized. Additionally, the randomness of the ship choices
should be ensured to avoid using the best or only sailable
ships each year and thus allowing a false sense of security.
8. Replace and modernize the NDRF as quickly as possible
with newer and better ships. Two possible changes to the
program are offered:
a. The possibility of buying other ships on the
world market should be explored. These purchases
could coincide whenever shipping is in a recession
and excess tonnage is being sold cheaply.
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b. The possibility of building a new class of
inexpensive, break-bulk self-sustaining ships
should be thoroughly researched. These ships
could be financed by scrapping old ships and
building modularly in order to hold down the
cost.
9. Complete and thorough research should be conducted to
assess the feasibility of various ship designs for military
purposes such as containers, LASH, and Ro/Ro classes. Per-
haps new unloading methods and systems can be developed which
will render the DOD need for break-bulk ships obsolete or at
least decrease the requirement significantly.
10. Above all if the NDRF and especially the RRF program
are to continue to expand and to contribute meaningfully to
national defense the funds expended by the Navy and MARAD must
be spent wisely. The money is limited and poor control cannot
be allowed. Additionally, in this era of Proposition 13 funding
projects that do not offer immediate return should be handled
carefully. Any hint of improprieties could be met with funds
being discontinued and a vital asset could be lost due to
shortsighted and poor management.
C . SUMMARY
Although control of the NDRF and the RRF contingent should
remain with MARAD, DOD must take an active interest in them
to assure that its requirements are being met. DOD should not
only cooperate and work with MARAD in an owner/customer
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relationship but also in the sense of a partner relationship.
That is MARAD and DOD must present to Congress and the
American public a solid front in order to gain the funding
required and understanding necessary for a highly important
defense program. Sub-optimization cannot be allowed, the
common good must be all important.
D. THE IDEAL
The ideal solution for DOD would be the non-requirement of
the NDRF. In order for this to occur the active fleet of the
U.S. Merchant Marine would have to expand considerably. How-
ever, for this to happen drastic changes in national policy
must be undertaken. The United States should develop and
establish itself as a maritime economic power and reduce its
dependence on foreign flag shipping.
The development of Soviet mercantile power should be of
special concern to the American public. Charles I. Hiltzheiner,
Chairman of Sealand Service Inc., a unit of R.J. Reynolds
Industries Inc., told a forum in Portland, Oregon, recently
that, "The Soviet Union is deliberately placing an iron curtain
of ships on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans between us and
our allies, to isolate us physically and economically from the
rest of the world. " (12 :12) Perhaps a government agency should
be set up to sell the merchant marine to the American public
much in the way the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has success-
fully promoted the airlines.
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A final characteristic of the ideal solution is to have
all U.S. transportation, both domestic and international
brought together under the auspices of one and only one
regulatory department in order that coordination and coopera-





Problem Areas During Activation
The following is a list of problem areas causing lost
time of reactivated ships during the Vietnam Conflict:
1. Boiler (tubing leaks, bottom blow valve spool,
header, boiler water testing line, soot blower,
level indicators)
2. Condenser (tubes leaking)
3. Electrical (turbogenerator, emergency diesel
generator, electrical control panel, electrical
system, starting motor, fan motor)
4. Fresh water evaporator (tubing)
5. Pumps (turbine feed pump, fuel oil pump, feed
pump governors, sanitary pump, main condensate
pump motor, main circulating pump, miscellaneous
pumps)
6. Main Engine (turbine, reduction gears, throttle)
7. Refrigeration (domestic reefer boxes, main
refrigeration system)
8. Piping (salt water lines)
9
.
Radio , Radar , Echo Sounder
10. Telemotor
11. Topping lifts
12. Winches (winch controls, winch armature, lifeboat
winches)
13. Anchor windlass motor





GENERAL AGENCY AGREEMENT VESSEL MAINTENANCE
AND REPAIR COSTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM
TOTAL TOTAL M&R COST
VOYAGE DAYS M&R PER VOYAGE
YEAR OPERATION COST DAY
1965 1,697 $ 379,664 223
1966 34,135 15,049,402 441
1967 66,064 30,960,248 468
1968 51,503 21,016,082 408
1969 29,914 15,100,154 505
1970 7,596 2,434,381 320
Total 190,909 $84,940,261
Total M&R Cost $84,940,261
Total Voyage Days 190,909
$445 Total Average M&R Cost Per
Voyage Day
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Oily Wastes - According to 37 CFR 24 6, Subchapter - Pollution,
all vessels constructed before July 1, 1974 operating in U.S.
navigable waters or contiguous zones (12 miles offshore) are
required to have:
1. Capacity to retain on board oily waste and oily bilge
slops that may accumulate while operating in the
navigable waters or contiguous zones.
2. For fuel oil discharge containment, (1) a fixed
container or enclosed deck area of at least two
barrels capacity under and around each fuel tank vent,
overflow and fill pipe; or (2) a portable container at
least 18 inches deep which has at least a 5 gallon
capacity under each fuel tank vent, overflow and fill
pipe; or (3) a flush deck fitting which is being
serviced by an automatic back pressure shutoff nozzle.
3. At least one pump installed to discharge oily bilge
slops or ballast through a fixed pipe system which
shall have at least one standard discharge outlet on
each side of the weather deck.
4
.
Each such outlet should have a shore connection or
the vessel should have at least one portable adapter
that fits the outlets.
5. A means on the weather deck near the discharge to
stop each pump used to discharge oily waste and a
stop valve installed at each outlet.
6. A placard that states "The Federal Water Pollution
Control Act prohibits the discharge of oil or oily
waste into or upon the navigable waters and con-
tiguous zone of the United States if such discharge
causes a film or sheen upon, or discoloration of,
the surface of the water, or causes a sludge or emul-
sion beneath the surface of the water. Violators
are subject to a penalty of $5,000."





MARINE SANITATION DEVICES - Various requirements regarding
overboard discharge are stated in 40 CFR 21, Part 159 - Marine
Sanitation Devices. These rules specify certification proce-
dures, and design and construction requirements. They affect
existing as well as new vessels.
Victory ships were constructed before promulgation of
the marine sanitation devices (MSD) regulations and standards.
Under the regulations for existing vessels, it is not necessary
to install any type of MSD until January 30, 198 0, after which
it is mandatory to install Type 11 or Type 111 MSD's. If the
Type 1 Device is installed by January 30, 1978, then Type 1
may be used indefinitely.
Type 1 Device - U.S.C.G. certified overboard dis-
charge to 1000 fecal coliform per
100 ml plus no "visible floating
solids" standard.
Type II Device - U.S.C.G. overboard discharge certi-
fied to 2000 fecal coliform per
100 ml plus 15 mg/1 total suspended
solids standards.
Type III Device - U.S.C.G. certified to no-discharge
standard (i.e., this can be a
holding tank with means to pump
either shoreside or overboard beyond
the 12 mile limit)
.





Codes of Federal Regulations
Responsibilities of the Coast Guard are covered in the
following Codes of Federal Regulations (CFR's):
Title 33 - Navigation and Navigable Waters
Chapter 1 Coast Guard, Department
of Transportation (Parts 0-199)
Title 46 - Shipping
Chapter 1 - Coast Guard, Department
of Transportation (Parts 0-199)
Chapter III - Coast Guard (Great Lakes
Pilotage) , Department of Transportation
(Parts 400-499)
Title 49 - Transportation
Chapter I - Coast Guard, Department
of Transportation (Parts 400-499)









Special Periodic Survey 4 (1)
Boiler and steam piping
hydrostatic 4 4 (2)
Inspection for Certification 2 (3)
Reinspection or Annual 10 to 14 mos. after
certification (4)
1 (5)
Drydocking 2 (6) 2 (6)
Tail Shaft withdrawal 3 (7) 3 (7)
Cargo gear 4 (8)
Load Line Certificate 5 (9)
Boiler Studs and Boltings 8
Notes: 1. Includes drydocking and detailed examination of
hull, fittings, ground tackle, machinery, auxiliary
and electrical equipment, boiler and steam piping
hydrostatic tests (as per Coast Guard rules)
,
internal combustion engines, controls, refrigeration
systems, shafting and bearings, etc., included open-
ing and closing of equipment where required. The
ABS allows one year of grace within which to com-
plete the Special Periodic Survey; however, this
does not extend the four year interval.
2. Part of Special Periodic Survey.
3. Visual and operation inspection of hull, machinery,
life saving equipment, fire mains, pollution
prevention, sanitation, etc.
4. General visual check on Inspection for Certification.
5. General visual check of hull and machinery.
6. Permits extension of docking intervals based on
special circumstances i.e., operation in fresh
water, ship lay-up, special coatings, impressed
current hull protection, etc.
7. Can be extended under special circumstances, but not
more than one additional year (per Coast Guard)
8. Requires complete cargo gear load test with winches,
also proof tests of equipment. Coast Guard requires
annual check for condition and suitably.
9. Delegated by Coast Guard to ABS; check for correct load
marks and also require annual survey for endorsement.





AVERAGE MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT IN
SELECTED COMMERCIAL SHIP REPAIR
YARDS WITH DRYDOCK FACILITIES
(as of January of each year)
TYPE OF WORK PERFORMED
Other
Year MARAD Navy Federal Private Total
1959 25 1,654 4,883 6,562
1960 312 4,610 4,922
1961 16 1,470 4,143 5,629
1962 1,948 4,777 6,725
1963 1,106 4,418 5,524
1964 1,638 4,296 5,934
1965 5,775 5,246 11,021
1966 653 5,148 5,523 11,324
1967 288 6,171 7,714 14,173
1968 2 5,901 251 6,733 12,887
1969 10 5,763 79 5,951 11,803
1970 10,127 95 5,863 16,085
1971 55 6,499 238 8,128 14,920
1972 1 5,793 208 6,856 12,858
1973 2,778 61 4,792 7,631
1974 4,160 68 5,423 9,651
1975 2,756 212 6,389 9,357



























Maryland S.B. & D.D. Co.
Baltimore, Md.
Newport News SB & DD Co.
Newport News , Va
.
Norfolk SB & DD Corp.
Norfolk, Va.
Savannah Mach. & DD Co.
Savannah, Georgia

























Ship Repair Yard No. of Drydocks
GULF COAST




Livingston, S.B. Co. 1*
Orange, Texas













Lockheed SB & Const. Co. 2*
Seattle, Wash.
National Steel & SB Co. 2*
San Diego, Calif.








Willamette Iron & Steel 5
Richmond, Calif.
* Yard as additional drydock(s) not large enough to accommodate
a Victory ship. Employment data, however, are for the
entire yard as no separation could be made.






















Four phased activation plan :
Phase I - There are 146 work items for Phase I (Activation) —
16 to be performed in drydock and 130 topside. These
range from checking keys for proper identification to
placing the main engine in operation. The Phase I
(Activation) work is estimated to require up to 44,000
man-hours per ship (1976 production rates; changes in
labor agreements and government regulations could
change production rates) and $140,000 (1976 prices)
for material. This amount of work is necessary in
this Phase I activation in order to permit the final
activation for service to be accomplished with the
5-10 day requirement. Supplemental repairs, which
would differ with each individual ship, are not
covered in the Phase I standard specification but
are estimated to average $162,000 (1976 prices)
per ship. These estimates will be verified in the
first fiscal year in which this program is imple-
mented during which a limited number of initial
activations will be performed.
Phase II - (Deactivation) specification covers the work
necessary to prepare the ship for return to the
National Defense Reserve Fleet in a ready status
and commences after the completion of the dock
trial under Phase I. It is estimated that this
work will require up to 4,750 manhours and $16,000
(1976 prices) for material per vessel.
Phase III - (Activation Retention in Ready Reserve Status)
specification covers the work necessary to be per-
formed by the National Defense Reserve Fleet
personnel to hold the ships in the Ready Response
status. This effort differs substantially from
current retention procedures by adding a rapid
response objective to the retention procedure.
The work steps outlined in the specification are
estimated to require one man year per year per ship.
Phase IV - (Activation for Service) specification is estimated to
require approximately 9,4 00 man-hours. This work
can be performed within the 5-10 day breakout
requirement since no drydocking will be required
at the time of the final activation. The usual
activation bottleneck, i.e., available drydock
capacity, is therefore avoided at the time of
activation for service.
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Fuel Oil (D.B. 's+Settlers)


































Source: Military Sea Transportation Service Supplement









Depth to Main Deck Side




































































Depth, molded to main deck






Total Fuel Oil, tanks 98%
Total dry cargo (Grain)




























Turbine Double Red Gear
8500
16.5




The basic characteristics of Seatrains are :
Length, Overall 559' -11"
Breadth (Molded) 68' -0"
Depth (Molded to Main Dk.) 3 9' -3"
Height (Keel to Span Dk.
)
62' -3"
Maximum Draft Loaded 27 ' -0"
Light Ship (Incl. Ballast) 10,663
D.W. Tonnage (At Deep Draft) 10,337
Displacement Tonnage 21,000
Fuel Capacity (BBLS.) 16,500
Shaft H.P. 10,000
Speed (Knots) 16.5
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